Civil Unions Reconsidered by John G. Culhane
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 26 
Issue 3 Volume 26, Spring 2012, Issue 3 Article 5 
March 2012 
Civil Unions Reconsidered 
John G. Culhane 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
John G. Culhane (2012) "Civil Unions Reconsidered," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: 
Vol. 26 : Iss. 3 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol26/iss3/5 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an 
authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
CIVIL UNIONS RECONSIDERED
JOHN G. CULHANE*
INTRODUCTION
The prevailing view on civil unions is perhaps best captured by the
brilliant parody news source, The Onion. In a story set in 2083, a high
school history class is both amused and outraged that it took so long for
same-sex couples to achieve full marriage equality. In that context, one
student offers this breezy dismissal of the civil union: "Oh my God, and
those civil union things were ridiculous, too. Just let gay people get married
already!"'
That hindsight-assisted student might turn out to have been correct.
"Those civil union things" are intended to bestow the full rights of
marriage while pointedly reserving the marriage label (and attendant social
meaning and prerogatives) for opposite-sex couples. Since those tasks are
impossible, civil unions may be headed for one of history's many
oubliettes.
Yet civil unions, it turns out, are more interesting than you might think.
Seen by many - including me, once - mostly as an interesting,
idiosyncratic artifact of compromise on the road to full marriage equality,
the civil union and the circumstances of its birth have the potential to
illuminate deep issues about the meaning of marriage and the deep basis of
objection to marriage equality. Moreover, the process of creating the civil
union has necessarily led lawmakers to think hard about the real, practical
needs of their constituents. This process has occasionally spun off an
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Population Studies. Contributor, SLATE MAGAZINE. I would like to thank the staff of the St. John's
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development for their excellent symposium on marriage
equality; this work grows out of my presentation at that event. I would also like to thank my research
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unrelated but welcome development: the creation of legal protections for
those in other relationships - as in the "reciprocal beneficiary" status
created for older Vermonters and Californians, 2 and the availability of the
civil union to opposite-sex couples in Hawaii and Illinois.3
Thus, while it is unlikely in the extreme that this political compromise
will long survive, it would be a mistake to dismiss this status as nothing
more than a way station. In this brief essay, I want to explore the fuller
meaning of the civil union.
Part I briefly reviews the civil union: its legal precedents, its effect, and
its current status in the U.S. Part II begins with a discussion of the practical
problems with civil unions, and then moves to the heart of my thesis:
Despite protestations to the contrary, civil unions are not the equivalent of
marriage because they were never really intended to be. The error is in
reducing marriage to a set of legal benefits and entitlements and then
constructing a parallel entity to mimic that fictional creation. Yet perhaps
the civil union will have other positive effects, even if those effects are not
what their champions originally envisioned for them.
I. DESCRIBING THE CIVIL UNION: ANTECEDENTS, EFFECT, AND STATUS
As has been exhaustively chronicled, civil unions grew out of a twenty-
plus year struggle for LGBT legal equality. That history will not be
recounted here, but a few salient signposts need mentioning.
As the gay rights movement began to find traction in the 1970s, two
separate streams of activism formed that would later find expression in
what we today know as the battle for marriage equality. One of these was
the effort by several same-sex couples to compel their home states to
recognize their marriage. These efforts (in Minnesota, Kentucky, and
Washington) were spectacularly unsuccessful in the short run. 4 Lacking the
linguistic, legal and normative vocabulary needed to require the issuance of
marriage licenses to couples that just, well, could not marry, the courts
summarily dismissed each and every one of these actions. The couples had
operated without the assistance of advocacy groups, and paid heavily for
their losses - sometimes with the loss of employment for daring to "out"
2 See VT. STAT. ANN. TT. 15,§ 1301-1306; CAL. FAM. CODE. § 297(B) (West 2012).
3 HAw. REV. STAT. § 572B-1,2 (West 2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 75/§10 (West 2011).
4 See John G. Culhane, Marriage, Tort, & Private Ordering: Rhetoric & Reality in LGBT Rights,
84 CHI-KENT L. REv. 437, 440 (2009) (discussing the three aforementioned cases).
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themselves so dramatically.5
Proceeding along a parallel but more cautious track, activists in
California tried a more incremental and, as it turned out, more successful
approach. Rather than agitating for state-wide recognition of full equality,
they sought only narrow, local recognition in places where success was
much likelier. Indeed, the first such effort was staged in Berkeley,
California, and led, after a few years, to success both there and in
neighboring San Francisco. These efforts began in the late 1970s but did
not bear fruit until the mid-1980s.6
In the ensuing decades, the resulting entity, known as the "domestic
partnership," spread in several complementary ways. First, it migrated to
other locations, and not only within California. Progressive cities and
municipalities across the U.S. began to recognize same-sex relationships, at
least for limited purposes (usually to provide health benefits to the same-
sex partners of government employees, but sometimes in conjunction with
anti-discrimination protection or to permit same-sex partners to assume
some limited responsibility for each other, such as in hospital visitation).
Second, once same-sex couples had been accorded status by some local
entities within a state, it was natural to expect the pressure to increase on
state legislatures to recognize those same couples. In California, for
example, in 1999 the legislature became the first to create a state-wide
domestic partnership registry.7 Although this prototype conferred only a
modest set of benefits, the entitlements - along with certain responsibilities
- were expanded by two subsequent acts, until today they are intended to
do what civil unions also attempt: to confer the full benefits of marriage,
withholding "only" the label. 8 This expansion of the benefits themselves
was the third way that the domestic partnership grew.
Yet in 1999, no one would have equated this entity - nor the awkwardly
named "reciprocal beneficiary" that arose in Hawaii in the wake of a failed
5 A job that been offered to one of the plaintiffs in the Minnesota case was withdrawn after the case
was filed. See Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV.
15, 21 (2000).
6 William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A Review and Critique,
2001 B.Y.U.L. REv. 961, 965, 977 (2001).
7 See Scott L. Cummings, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1259-60
(2010) (providing an insightful backround as to how the bill was passed).
8 The two most significant expansions to the law occurred in 2001 and 2003 (the latter law took
effect on January 1, 2005). The 2001 law greatly expanded the rights available to registered domestic
partners, and included survivorship benefits, medical visitation rights, the ability to recover for
relational torts such as wrongful death, and joint adoption. A.B. 0025, 2001 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001).The
Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003 expressly equates the rights of all registered
domestic partners to those afforded married couples. Cal. Fam. Code § 297.5(a) (West 2013).
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marriage equality case there - with marriage. It was a piecemeal
aggregation of rights, recognition, and responsibility. It is against this
background that the civil union must be understood.
When judicial victories on marriage equality in Hawaii and Alaska in the
earlier 1990's had led to voter and legislative backlash,9 gay activists in
Vermont recognized the importance of ground-up coalition building. The
Vermont Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Rights (established in 1986 as the
Gay and Lesbian Coalition) formed the Vermont Freedom to Marry Task
Force in 1995, thereby laying important groundwork for a suit brought by
several same-sex couples in 1997 challenging their exclusion from the
rights and protections of marriage.
In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court issued a decision that might fairly
be characterized as the last thing anyone was expecting. Asked to decide
whether the exclusion of the plaintiff same-sex couples from the institution
of marriage amounted to a denial of equal protection of the law, as the
claimants had demanded,10 the court instead effected a surgical separation
of the benefits of marriage from the richer institution that houses those
benefits. In other words, the court required that the benefits of marriage be
afforded to same-sex couples, but left to the legislature the remedy: The
right to marry or, in the court's words, some other "appropriate means of
addressing th[e] constitutional mandate" of equality.
What means might those be? Although the court did not say that the law
had to confer exactly the same rights as marriage, it strongly implied as
much. After referring to "comprehensive" equality legislation - mostly
from Scandinavian countries - the court cautioned that it did "not intend
specifically to endorse any one or all of the referenced acts, particularly in
view of the significant benefits omitted from several of the laws."11
After a hard-fought, but mostly civilly conducted debate, the legislature
chose the middle course that the court had outlined: it created the virtually
legal equivalent of marriage, and called it the "civil union."12
9 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Hi. 1993) remanded to Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Hi. 1996);
Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781 (Ak. 2005) The rulings in these cases were
effectively undone by state constitutional amendments. HAWAII CONST., art. I, § 23; ALASKA CONST.,
art. I, § 25.
10 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (To be precise, the claim was that the denial of
marriage licenses to otherwise-qualified same-sex couples violated the common benefits clause of the
Vermont state constitution. That clause, though, is the state-law equivalent of the federal equal
protection clause, and the court in Baker and in many other cases freely borrows from federal precedent
in analyzing claims of inequality.).
11 Idat744.
12 VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 15, § 1201 (West 2012); David Moats, CIVIL WARS: A BATTLE FOR GAY
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As has been well-chronicled by several scholars and journalists, the
Vermont legislators declined other options open to them. On the one hand,
the legislature avoided granting full marriage equality, including the label.
Indeed, the law that was created pointedly states: "Marriage remains the
union of one man and one woman." 13
But the lawmakers also rejected the option at the other pole: pushing
through a constitutional amendment that would have defined marriage as
the union of a man and a woman (and would perhaps have ruled out
anything like the civil union, as well).
Instead, they gave birth to a new legal creature, intended to mimic
marriage in every legal respect. Indeed, the law lists the many benefits
intended to be conferred by the civil union and also states and the list is
"nonexclusive" and that "parties to a civil union shall have all the same
benefits, protections and responsibilities under law.. .as are granted to
spouses in a marriage."' 4
Baker was decided in late December of 1999, and the legislature acted
with both deliberation and dispatch, making a priority of the issue and
enacting the law in 2000. At the time, some (including me) strongly
objected to the court's creative decision that enabled what we saw as an
unsatisfactory compromise. But the civil union nonetheless was a major
step forward. In 2000, no other state was offering any similar rights to
same-sex couples.15 Only in California and Hawaii were same-sex couples
afforded recognition at all, and neither state's protections were anywhere
near as comprehensive.
Vermont went from 0 to 60 overnight.
MARRIAGE (2004).
13 2000 VT LEGIS. SERV. 91 (West)
14 Id.
15 Although gay and lesbian couples are the most obvious beneficiaries of marriage equality, I want
to pause here to mention how bisexual and transgendered couples might also benefit. Bisexuals provide
a dramatic illustration of the weakness of exclusionary rules. If, say, a bisexual woman happens to be
attracted to a man, she has the right to marry him; if, though, she finds herself seeking a commitment
with another woman, she will be denied that same right. This will be true even if, for example, she is
post-menopausal and therefore not a candidate for procreation no matter the sex of her partner.
For couples containing at least one transgendered (or gender non-conforming) person, the right to marry
would immediately cure a host of complex and contradictory problems that the law currently creates.
To oversimplify, in some states a transgendered person's gender of choice, no matter how deliberately
(or surgically) (re)constructed, is irrelevant: what matters is one's genetic, biological sex. In other
states, the trans person's choice is valued. In at least one state, a trans person might be unable to marry
anyone at all. In all such cases, though, a step is required that becomes needless if the requirement of
opposite gender is removed from marriage. A similar observation applies to intersexed people -
individuals whose genetic, biological, and hormonal make-up places them somewhere in a continuum
between what we commonly term male or female.
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Even in this liberal state, though, the battle was pitched. Probably a
majority of citizens did not favor even this level of relationship recognition,
and a substantial number would have voted for an anti-gay marriage
amendment had it been put to them; it might have passed if enacted quickly
enough.16 They might also have gone further and ruled out any virtual legal
equivalent, such as the civil union.
One might therefore agree with William Eskridge's conclusion that the
court and legislature acted properly in recognizing the wrong while
fashioning a less-than-complete remedy. These actions constitute what he
terms "equality practice":
The case of Vermont illustrates a central tension between liberal
theory and liberal practice, which lawyers. . .express as a tension
between right and remedy or (more abstractly) between the substance
of equality and the procedure used to get there. In a heterogeneous
polity, immediate equality is usually not attainable, but sometimes
equality practice is.17
The eminently practical approach Eskridge so eloquently defended had
no hold on me at the time. In a 2001 law review essay,' 8 I wrote
disapprovingly of the court's unwillingness to take the step that the whole
thrust of the opinion seemed to make inevitable: to require marriage,
including the name. One member of the court agreed with me. In a partial
dissent, Justice Denise Johnson accused the majority of shirking its
responsibility in the constitutional framework and sidestepping the very
question it had been asked.19
Put differently, once the arguments against inequality have been
eliminated, then requiring-worse, creating-a separate name really does
16 There is something oxymoronic about the term "quickly" as applied to the procedure for
amendment the Vermont Constitution, however. It happens that the procedure for amendment is long
and arduous in that state. See VT. CONST. ch. II, § 72 (1999) (setting forth the procedure for
amendment). Beginning in 1975, amendments can be proposed only during biennial sessions of the
General Assembly "convening every fourth year thereafter." Id. Proposals must be made by a two-
thirds vote of the Senate and then approved by a majority of the House of Representatives. Id.
Amendments approved through that process must then be referred to the next biennial session, and
reapproved by a majority of both the Senate and House. Id. If all of those hurdles are cleared, the
General Assembly must then submit the proposed amendment to the voters, who have the final say. Id.
Only if they approve the amendment by a majority does it finally become part of the state constitution.
Id.
17 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, 128 (1st ed. 2001).
18 See generally John G. Culhane, A Tale of Two Concurrences: Same-Sex Marriage & Products
Liability, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 447 (2001).
19 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 897 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (criticizing the majority's "novel and truncated remedy").
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stand as an exercise in separate but equal - which, of course, it never is.
I am a little surprised to discover that my views have changed, perhaps
boosted a bit by the fact that Vermont, in 2009, moved to full marriage
equality. But perhaps my change of heart is more than that: from a purist's
perspective, it is the court that is responsible for interpreting constitutional
guarantees. But it is not that simple. As the Bush v. Gore debacle reminds
us, 20 courts should not and cannot conclusively resolve every dispute. It
might turn out that, sometimes, legislatures and the electorate need some
breathing space, some room to catch up. Here, the court strongly nudged
the legislature and it responded with a comparatively very strong law.
Living with that law, over time, made the lawmakers realize that their
concerns really could not be defended by any neutral principles of secular
law, and so, in 2009, a supermajority of them (enough to override the
governor's veto) took the final step.
The court itself was startlingly explicit about the political dimension of
its ruling. Its justifications, set out in opposition to Justice Johnson's
dismay that the litigants were not being afforded the clear and direct
constitutional remedy they had sought, are worth quoting at some length:
Our colleague greatly underestimates what we decide today and greatly
overestimates the simplicity and effectiveness of her proposed mandate.
First, our opinion provides greater recognition of- and protection for-
same sex relationships than has been recognized by any court of final
jurisdiction in this country with the instructive exception of the Hawaii
Supreme Court in [Baehr v. Lewin.]False Second, the dissent's suggestion
that her mandate would avoid the "political caldron". . . of public debate
is-even allowing for the welcome lack of political sophistication of the
judiciary-significantly insulated from reality. See Hawaii Const., art. I, §
23; see also Alaska Const., art. I, § 25."21
The court could hardly have been clearer than had it stated: "If we
require marriage equality, the end result could be quite the opposite, as was
the case in both Hawaii and Alaska. And since we believe that equality is
required, it does not make sense for us to create incentives for the
legislature and the voters to move in exactly the opposite direction."
It is clear, but is it acceptable? The simplest response is that courts
should not be concerned with the politics that follow their decisions. That is
a principled position, but reflects neither judicial nor political reality. Even
20 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
21 Id. at 888.
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the much bolder decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health22 might not have been reached
had the Baker court not made such strong progress in the pro-equality
direction. This is a necessarily speculative remark, but given that the
Goodridge court split 4-3, it might have been decisive (to at least one jurist
on the court) that another court had already moved to within one small step
of complete legal equality.
Like current-swept swimmers searching for something to cling to,
legislatures in other states have lately begun to embrace the civil union (or
"full" domestic partnership) approach. This position enables politicians to
claim - with some justification - that they are concerned about their gay
and lesbian constituents while at the same time appeasing those who object,
usually for religious reasons, to using the word "marriage" to describe the
relationship between same-sex couples. For some of them, this cautious
approach might even be a way of doing the equality "practice" that
Eskridge favors.
Although New Jersey lawmakers did so by way of response to that state
supreme court's Baker-esque ruling in Lewis v. Harris,23 legislatures in
other states have done so without similar "prompting." In 2011 alone,
Hawaii, Delaware and Illinois enacted civil union laws. These laws
followed the enactment of comprehensive domestic partnership laws in
California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and the District of Columbia,
which are civil unions by a different name. 24 As this article was going to
press in late 2012, three more states opted for full marriage equality:
Maine, Maryland, and Washington. 25 But civil unions remain a vital
compromise in states not ready to take that final step.
Why is the formal equality the civil union confers not good enough?
22 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941(Mass. 2003).
23 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006).
24 This flowering of names and statuses appeals to those, like Nancy Polikoff, who believe both
that steps to reduce the privileged status of marriage are useful and that couples and families should
have greater choices in the relationships that they establish. See generally NANCY D. POLIKOFF,
BEYOND (STRAIGHT & GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (Beacon Press
2009). Conservatives on both sides of the marriage equality debate disagree, based on their contrary
belief that the state has a legitimate interest in continuing to privilege marriage. However one comes
down on this issue, it is undeniable that the current situation creates confusing issues of interstate
recognition that will only multiply when the Defense of Marriage Act is repealed.
25 Zach Ford, Sweeping 2012 Victories Show Promise Of LGBT Equality's Future, THINK
PROGRESS (Nov. 19, 2012 5:00 PM),http://thinkprogress.org/1gbt/2012/11/07/1155121/sweeping-
2012-victories-show-pronse-of-Igbt-equalitys-future/?mobile=nc.
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I. THE INADEQUACY OF THE CIVIL UNION
The brilliance of the compromise that led to civil unions
notwithstanding, this "marriage equivalent" fails of its essential purpose.
Even on the level where it is strongest - legal equality - it does not deliver
the goods promised, owing to a host of external factors that the civil union
is powerless to address. But its deeper difficulties have little to do with law.
A. The Legal Effects of Civil Unions
Before reaching the deeper difficulties with the civil union, it is
important to outline the ways that it fails as a legal status. The impediments
it faces are substantial, with two being particularly problematic: the civil
union is surely less portable than marriage, and would not be recognized
under federal law even if the Defense of Marriage Act were repealed. The
following is a brief discussion of each of these issues.
A civil union is almost certainly not as portable as marriage. One state's
recognition of a same-sex marriage celebrated in another might run afoul of
the "public policy" exception to the requirement that a state give full faith
and credit to "public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings" of other
states." 26 This outcome is more likely in states that have enacted their own
"mini-DOMAs"; 27 absent such a clear declaration of contrary public
policy, state attorney generals have sometimes opined that same-sex
marriages from other states will be recognized in the "home state." The
civil union, by contrast, is unlikely to find many "takers" in states that do
not confer comprehensive relationship recognition on same-sex couples.
New York provides an instructive example of the challenges that civil
unions face. In Langan v. St. Vincent's Hospital,28 the surviving member of
a New York couple brought a wrongful death suit against the medical
providers whose negligence had allegedly led to the death of his same-sex
26 U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.
27 See Human Rights Campaign: State Laws & Legislation, http://www.hrc.org/laws-and-
legislation/state (A majority of states have statutes or amendments to their constitutions that expressly
prohibit same-sex marriages; these are loosely referred to as mini-Defense of Marriage Acts aka "mini-
DOMAs"). The situation is further complicated because some of these laws ban only same-sex
marriages, while others sweep more broadly and purport to rule out any sort of relationship recognition
of same-sex couples. A good example of the complexity is Nevada, where a state statute prohibits
same-sex marriages, but where a 2009 law created domestic partnerships granting same-sex couples all
of the rights, benefits and privileges of marriage that state law can confer. Nevada Domestic Partnership
Act, 11 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122A (West 2011).
28 Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2003), rev'd, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (2d Dep't
2005), appeal dismissed, 850 N.E.2d 672 (N.Y. 2006).
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partner.
The couple had entered into a civil union in Vermont, which permits out-
of-state same-sex couples to "civilly unite" (and opposite-sex couples to
marry). But, as is the case with most wrongful death statutes, New York's
tightly restricts the class of eligible claimants - spouses are among these,
but "partners to a civil union" are not. Through a creative process that I
have detailed elsewhere, 29 the trial judge rejected a motion to dismiss the
claim. Using a combination of full faith and credit and comity, he read the
statute broadly so as to effectuate its dual purposes of compensating the
person likeliest to be impacted (financially as well as emotionally) by the
death and of deterring the defendant - and others - from negligent conduct
in the future.
Over a strong dissent, the appellate court briskly reversed this ruling.30
Avoiding detailed analysis of the full faith and credit arguments, the court
stood mainly on the indisputable fact that the couple was not married under
Vermont law, so that there was nothing to give full faith and credit to. Note
the court's pointed comparison between Massachusetts (which allows
same-sex marriages) and Vermont (which, at the time, did not): "The fact
that since the perfection of this appeal the State of Massachusetts has
judicially created such right for its citizens is of no moment here since the
plaintiff and the decedent were not married in that jurisdiction. They opted
for the most intimate sanctification of their relationship then permitted, to
wit, a civil union pursuant to the laws of the State of VermontFalse In
following the ruling of [Baker], the Vermont Legislature went to great
pains to expressly decline to place civil unions and marriage on an identical
basis."31
While the appellate court's holding in Langan left unclear whether out-
of-state marriages by same-sex couples would be recognized under New
York law, the state subsequently made clear that they would indeed be
afforded equal status. In Martinez v. County of Monroe,32 the plaintiff
successfully argued to a unanimous appellate court that her Canadian
marriage to another woman should be recognized in New York, thereby
entitling her to the same spousal benefits that her employer, a community
college, made available to other married employees. In finding that a
29 John G. Culhane, Even More Wrongful Death: Statutes Divorced from Reality, 32 FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 171, 182-84 (2005).
30 See generally Langan, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476.
31 Langan, 25 A.D.3d at 94.
32 Martinez v. County of Monroe, 50 A.D.3d 189 (2008).
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violation of state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, the court placed great weight on the fact that New York had
never enacted a law "defending" marriage against same-sex couples.
Therefore, the default presumption that marriages valid in the state of
celebration would be recognized in New York applied, and the college was
compelled to pay the benefits. Shortly thereafter, Governor David Paterson
directed all state agencies to recognize the out-of-state marriages of same-
sex couples. 33
Note, then, the stark contrast between the civil union and marriage when
it comes to interstate recognition of the couple. New York provides a clean
example of the difference, because that state was one of the few that had
neither any state-wide recognition of same-sex unions nor any law
expressly prohibiting them. This distinction supports the claim that the civil
union, for all of its effort at marriage mimicry, is incapable of doing even
that.34
There is an even more serious problem with the civil union's claim to be
a marriage equivalent - a claim that, for now, is covered up by federal law.
Many federal laws attach substantial consequences to marriage.
Consider, for example, the treatment of married couples under the Internal
Revenue Code, 35 the ability to sponsor a spouse into the U.S. under
immigration law,36 and the payment of social security death benefits to
surviving spouses.37 In general, though, the federal government does not
speak to the issue of who is actually married; that question is left to state
law, and the federal consequences follow.
But what if the couple is in a civil union? Since the federal laws nowhere
mention - much less grant benefits to - couples in a civil union, that status
might be worthless at the federal level. Compare Massachusetts and, say,
New Jersey: A same-sex couple can marry in Massachusetts, but can only
be partners to a civil union in New Jersey. Under the usual understanding
of how the federal laws regard marriage status, then, only the
33 Jeremy W. Peters, New York to Back Same-Sex Unions from Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES (May 29,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/29/nyregion/29marriage.html?_r-2&hp&oref-slogin.
34 In 2011, New York rendered this "full faith and credit" debate obsolete by enacting a full
marriage equality law. See Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex
Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/nyregion/gay-marriage-approved-by-new-york-
senate.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
35 I.R.C. § 6013 (2006) (stating that legally married couples are entitled to file a joint tax return).
36 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (2006) (explaining that qualified immigrants who are the spouses of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence shall be allocated visas).
37 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1) (2006).
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Massachusetts couple would be considered wed for federal purposes -
however the two couples might be similarly treated within their home
states.
This stark difference, though, has been erased for the time being by the
federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"). One of DOMA's two
substantive provisions takes the unprecedented step of defining marriage
for federal purposes. That definition expressly excludes same-sex
couples. 38 Several lawsuits are challenging that part of DOMA, and the
Obama Administration has decided no longer to defend it.39 If this
provision of the law is ultimately declared unconstitutional - or if Congress
ever gets around to repealing it - the stark differences between civil unions
and domestic partnerships, on one hand, and "real" marriages, on the other,
will be laid bare.
It is possible, of course, that some kind of "federal civil union" might be
recognized as a compromise (either by courts or legislatively), whatever
DOMA's fate. Were such a law to declare state marriages to be civil unions
for federal purposes, one might expect that civil unions might truly begin to
approximate marriages, from a purely legal perspective. In addition to
federal benefits being equalized for states that had either civil unions or full
marriage equality, we might expect that states already somewhat
sympathetic to the rights of same-sex couples would begin to look at the
two types of union similarly under principles of full faith and credit. For
the current majority of states that have strong public policies against
marriage equality - either in statute or by virtue of state constitutional
provisions - neither would likely be recognized in any case.
38 1 U.S.C § 7 (2006).
39 See Massachusetts v. United States HHS, 692 F-3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2012) (consolidated with
Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 389 (2011); Windsor v. United States,
699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012); Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court to Consider Gay-Marriage Cert
Petitions Before Thanksgiving, ABA JOURNAL (Nov. 20, 2012 10:30PM),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/supreme-court-to-considergay-
marriagecertpetitions before thanksgiving/; Letter from Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., to John Boehner,
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-v-office-of-personnel-management/doj-letter-re-ma-doma-
cases-02-201 l.pdf (declaring that the Department of Justice no longer believed that section 3 of DOMA
could be constitutionally defended); Letter from Tony West, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Margaret Carter,
Clerk of the U.S. Court of Appeals (Feb. 24, 2011), available at
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-v-office-of-personnel-management/doj-letter-re-ma-doma-
cases-02-20 1 .pdf (explaining that DOMA could not be defended because its true basis was anti-gay
animus).
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B. Civil Unions and the Problem ofDeep Meaning
Even within a state that recognizes civil unions, people do not always
know what they are. The final report of the NJ Civil Union Commission -
which unanimously recommended conferring full marriage equality on
same-sex couples - recounted many stories of couples whose unions were
not recognized despite their purported legal equivalence to marriage.40 The
Vermont Civil Union Commission reached essentially the same
conclusions.41 In essence, those conclusions reduce to this observation:
Civil unions are not marriage, and everyone knows it - those in the civil
union, those confronted with whether to recognize it, and the broader
society.
Both commissions were created by the very same statute that recognized
the civil union for the first time; 42 in that sense, the lawmakers planted the
seeds of the civil union's own destruction.
There is scarcely need to recount all the stories the commissioners in
both states heard. A few examples make the point.
Consider first partner health insurance benefits. Employers who self-
insure for health benefits are covered by the federal Employer Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), and therefore need not recognize same-
sex spouses as legal. But couples in Vermont and New Jersey found that,
compared to couples legally married in Massachusetts, they faced greater
obstacles.43 Even though the employers could have invoked DOMA to
deny benefits to the same-sex couples married in Massachusetts, they
typically did not do so. They did not want to be seen as discriminating
between married couples on the basis of sexual orientation. On the other
hand, employers in the civil union states could simply point to the different
name and status, "civil union," and then refuse to cover the same-sex
"spouses" qua spouses.44 Note the dark synergy of DOMA and the civil
40 N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM'N, FINAL REPORT (2008),
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcr/downloads/CURC-Final-Report-.pdf
41 See REPORT OF THE VERMONT CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM'N (2001),
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/baker/cureport.htm; see also REPORT OF THE VERMONT COMM'N ON FAMILY
RECOGNITION & PROTECTION (2008),
http://hrc.vermont.gov/sites/hrc/files/pdfs/ss%20marriage/VCFRP Report.pdf (finding persistent
problems with civil unions including a lack of portability, differences in benefits and responsibilities
when compared to marriage, and issues relating to terminology, and social, cultural and historical
significance).
42 N.J. STAT. ANN. §37:1-28 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 15 § 1201 (2) (2011).
43 FIRST INTERIM REPORT OF THE N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM'N. (2008),
http://wwwstate.nj.us/lps/dcr/downloads/1st-InterimReport-CJRC.pdf
44 Id.
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union: DOMA provided legal justification for refusing benefits, and the
different name and status of the civil union supplied the cover of language.
Now, as the commissioners recognized, some of these problems would
doubtless dissipate with time, but there is a deeper point here.
The more complex reasons that civil unions just cannot be equivalent to
marriage also reveal something about marriage itself and what it means,
what it conveys. Simply put, no newly created legal entity - whatever its
name - can duplicate marriage, which is such a rich (if flawed) institution.
C. What, exactly, is marriage?
It turns out that it is far more than a set of legal entitlements. Indeed, if
legal equality were all there was to it, I think this fight would be - if not
over - well into the closing phase by now. Substantial majorities of those
polled favor legal equality, whether the question is support for civil unions
or support for the individual benefits that marriage confers. When the
pollsters ask whether the respondents favor same-sex marriage, though,
support drops substantially (although it continues to rise and is now at
about the break-even point).45
So what do we mean when we say that a couple is married? On one
level, we do mean that they have a legally sanctioned union that the state
supports and that confers certain tangible benefits. But that is by no means
all that is signified.
What else does marriage mean? Once we get away from a clear legal
definition that everyone can agree on (at least in one sense of "agreement"),
there is much less consensus. But I think we can identify at least a few of
the other things marriage is meant to signify.
First, it conveys a commitment. This is obvious from tired clich6s like
"the ball and chain" and many other popular depictions.
It is also telling that people are forced to explain what a civil union even
is.46 Everyone understands marriage and little is required to document it in
most situations. By contrast, a civil union sounds like a set of contracts
drawn up to ensure certain rights. It does not convey the same sense of
extra-legal commitment. That is not to say that people in civil unions-just
like some unmarried, cohabitating couples (straight and gay alike) - are
45 See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RESEARCH (Nov. 20, 2012 10:30PM),
http://features.pewforum.org/same-sex-marriage-attitudes/index.php; Polling Report, (Nov. 20, 2012
10:31PM), http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm
46 N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM'N., FINAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 9.
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not, in many cases, just as committed as those legally married. But civil
unions and domestic partnerships do not have the same heft, the same
resonance.
Consider the following example. Imagine two injured people. The first,
Joseph, is married to a woman, Barbara. When Barbara shows up at the
hospital and demands to see Joseph, experience shows that the request is
granted even without documentation.
The second injured person, Paul, is in a civil union with another man,
Zeke. When Zeke, the "partner to a civil union" shows up, he might be met
with a blank stare. Even if he can prove the relationship through documents
- and how many of us, in any kind of relationship, carry such papers with
us? - he might be less than uncritically accepted as the spouse. The
situation will doubtless be aggravated in a state, such as Florida, that has no
kind of relationship recognition at all.
Of course, even if the same-sex couple were allowed to marry, I would
not expect instant and universal changes to behavior. If the staff did not
like same-sex marriage, or did not know the law (although this is harder to
imagine), they might require the same-sex couple to prove it in a way that
would never occur to them to do in the case of an opposite-sex couple.
But the law could be expected to effect swift and enforceable changes to
behavior.
Second, marriage also carries religious significance, for many. I do not
mean just that religions "bless" marriages, either. It is more than that. For
many people, the civil marriage carries religious significance. Many
churches want and expect couples to civilly marry, and many people attach
religious meaning to their civil marriages.
In the United States, we further this conflation of the religious and civic
spheres by vesting the state's power to solemnize marriages in the clergy.
Changing that practice by divesting clerics of this power would be a useful
step - one that is at once quite small in fact (clergy would still perform
solemnizations) and rather large in symbolism (couples would need official
solemnization from government, thereby reminding them that all marriages
are, in fact, civil unions). The French, with their clear separation of the two,
are the model to emulate here. (Some have even speculated that the
popularity of the "pacte civile de solidarit6" (known as "PACS") in France
is related to this separation. This institution, created in 1999 principally to
confer some of the benefits of marriage on same-sex couples, has proven
quite popular with opposite-sex couples, who are also permitted to enter
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into these less-binding arrangements. 47
Third, marriage has an enormously important normative dimension, with
most of society still regarding being married as a desirable state. I have
written about this elsewhere, and this brief article is not the occasion to
expand on the argument. 48 Whether this arguably coercive feature of
marriage is a good or a bad thing depends on one's take on the institution.
But certainly the decision to marry, and the institution of marriage, are not
viewed neutrally. Thus, for couples that want to be married, the inability to
participate in an activity that many regard as "required" or at least desirable
is a negative. This point applies to both same- and opposite-sex couples,
and the civil union is unlikely to be regarded as an acceptable substitute
within this framework, at least not for the same-sex couples excluded from
marriage. For opposite-sex couples who regard marriage negatively,
though, the civil union may in fact be quite appealing. I have written
elsewhere about the availability of the civil union for opposite-sex couples
in Illinois, some of whom prefer this institution to marriage because it does
not carry the same historical baggage that they reject.49 (I will explore this
issue further in a subsequent article.)
CONCLUSION
Are civil unions necessarily inferior to marriages for same-sex couples?
Can one imagine a case in which civil unions would not be a slap in the
face (in the guise, oddly, of equality)? I tried a few thought experiments. I
tried to make the facts more and more sympathetic to the project before
realizing that the very difficulty itself spoke volumes about the clout that
the "M word" has - often imitated, never duplicated.
So here is the hypothetical I came up with: What if at the very dawn of
this marriage equality debate, reasonable people said: "OK, same-sex
couples are entitled to full equality. But there are some differences between
same-sex and opposite-sex couples that are biological and the law should
47 Scott Sayare & Maia DeLaBaume, In France, Civil Unions Gain Favor Over Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.comf/2010/12/16/world/europe/16france.html? r-I&scp=l&sq-pacte%20civile&st
=c (noting that 95% of all PACs were between opposite-sex couples).
48 John G. Culhane, Public Health & Marriage (Equality), in RECONSIDERING LAW & POLICY
DEBATES: A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 89, 89 (John G. Culhane ed., 2010).
49 See John Culhane, No to Nuptials, SLATE, Jan. 3, 2012,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-andjpolitics/jurisprudence/2012/01/are_states that experiment wi
thopposite sex civil unions offering_a way to opt out ofoppressive ideas about marriage html
(last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
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reflect that. The presumption of paternity is one that comes to mind. So we
are going to create a parallel body of law that does everything M does but
by another name. Is that acceptable?"
I am not sure I would believe the motivation. After all, there are many
parts of the marriage law that do not apply to specific couples, or to whole
groups of people - like the elderly, the infertile and so on. And no one has
suggested creating a new body of law for them. So why do so in this case? I
can see no good reason, other than political compromise (which, as I have
argued, is acceptable for the present) or anti-gay animus (not good, and
unconstitutional as discrimination).
Courts do not operate in a social vacuum, and, as the Vermont Supreme
Court astutely noted, risk not only backlash in the short term but
delegitimization in the long term if they fail to husband their power. Baker
v. State, with the benefit of a decade's hindsight, is best understood as an
exercise in giving the political process some breathing room, and allowing
the democratic process to unfold in a way that is respectful to deeply held
concerns on all sides. Yet the court handicapped the debate, insisting that
substantial steps toward legal equality were required. As the civil union so
pointedly shows, the rest is up to us.
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